BlanchetFOSAD14

Bruno Blanchet Back to publications

Bruno Blanchet. Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: the Verifier ProVerif. In Alessandro Aldini, Javier Lopez, and Fabio Martinelli, editors, Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, FOSAD Tutorial Lectures, volume 8604 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 54-87. Springer, 2014.

Copyright

Get the paper

.pdf, 316 Kb

Links

LNCS series home page.

This paper at Springer http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_3.

Abstract

After giving general context on the verification of security protocols, we focus on the automatic symbolic protocol verifier ProVerif. This verifier can prove secrecy, authentication, and observational equivalence properties of security protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives defined by rewrite rules or by equations. The tool takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a process calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol into an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses, and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses.

Bibtex


@INCOLLECTION{BlanchetFOSAD14,
  AUTHOR = {Bruno Blanchet},
  TITLE = {Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: the Verifier {P}ro{V}erif},
  BOOKTITLE = {Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, FOSAD Tutorial Lectures},
  PAGES = {54--87},
  PUBLISHER = {Springer},
  YEAR = 2014,
  EDITOR = {Alessandro Aldini and Javier Lopez and Fabio Martinelli},
  VOLUME = 8604,
  SERIES = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}
}

E-mail/Courrier électronique : Bruno.Blanchet@trap-inria.fr (remove trap-)