AbadiBlanchetFournetTISSEC07
Back to ProVerif
Martín Abadi, Bruno Blanchet, and Cédric Fournet.
Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
10(3):1-59, July 2007. Case study
Copyright
Permission to make digital/hard copy of all or part of
this material without fee for personal or classroom use
provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit
or commercial advantage, the ACM copyright/server notice, the title of the
publication, and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by
permission of the ACM, Inc. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee. Copyright ACM.
Get the paper
.ps.gz, 309 Kb, .pdf, 398 Kb
Links
Official ACM version (you can download the full text from there):
Software and scripts
Abstract
JFK is a recent, attractive protocol for fast key
establishment as part of securing IP communication. In this paper, we
analyze it formally in the applied pi calculus (partly in terms of
observational equivalences, partly with the assistance of an
automatic protocol verifier). We treat JFK's core security
properties, and also other properties that are rarely articulated
and studied rigorously, such as plausible deniability and resistance
to denial-of-service attacks. In the course of this analysis we
found some ambiguities and minor problems, such as limitations in
identity protection, but we mostly obtain positive results about
JFK. For this purpose, we develop ideas and techniques that should
be useful more generally in the specification and verification of
security protocols.
Bibtex
@ARTICLE{AbadiBlanchetFournetTISSEC07,
AUTHOR = {Martín Abadi and Bruno Blanchet and Cédric Fournet},
TITLE = {Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus},
JOURNAL = {ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)},
YEAR = 2007,
VOLUME = 10,
NUMBER = 3,
PAGES = {1--59},
MONTH = JUL
}
Just fast keying in the pi calculus