Users of ProVerif

If you have written a research paper or a tool using ProVerif, or teach a course on ProVerif, and want it to be added to this page, or if you want the reference to your paper/tool/course to be removed or corrected, please contact Bruno Blanchet.

Research papers

350+ publications have used ProVerif.

We list rank A* or A conferences first for each year, then other publications. Click here to see only the rank A* or A conferences.

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

From 2025, due to the large number of papers, we only cite A* and A conferences, according to ICORE conference ranking 2026.

  1. Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Lasse Letager Hansen, Franziskus Kiefer, Jonas Schneider-Bensch, and Bas Spitters. Formal Security and Functional Verification of Cryptographic Protocol Implementations in Rust. In Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '25). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2729–2743. Available at https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765213.
  2. Vincent Diemunsch, Lucca Hirschi, and Steve Kremer. A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis of OPC UA. In: 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), pp. 7077--7096. Available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/diemunsch.
  3. Pascal Lafourcade, Dhekra Mahmoud, Sylvain Ruhault, and Abdul Rahman Taleb. A Tale of Two Worlds, a Formal Story of WireGuard Hybridization. In 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), pp. 4937--4956. Available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/lafourcade.
  4. Xiaofeng Liu, Chaoshun Zuo, Qinsheng Hou, Pengcheng Ren, Jianliang Wu, Qingchuan Zhao, Shanqing Guo. A Thorough Security Analysis of BLE Proximity Tracking Protocols. In: 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), pp. 5347-5364. Available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/liu-xiaofeng.
  5. Ayoub Ben Hassen, Pascal Lafourcade, Dhekra Mahmoud, and Maxime Puys. Formal Analysis of SDNsec: Attacks and Corrections for Payload, Route Integrity and Accountability. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS '25). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1476–1489. Available at https://doi.org/10.1145/3708821.3710828.
  6. Ioana Boureanu, Cristina Onete, Stephan Wesemeyer, Léo Robert, Rhys Miller, Pascal Lafourcade, and Fortunat Rajaona. Post-Compromise Security with Application-Level Key-Controls – with a comprehensive study of the 5G AKMA protocol. In: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS '25). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 231–247. Available at https://doi.org/10.1145/3708821.3733910.
  7. Faezeh Nasrabadi, Robert Künnemann, and Hamed Nemati. Symbolic Parallel Composition for Multi-language Protocol Verification. In: 2025 IEEE 38th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), Santa Cruz, CA, USA, 2025, pp. 378-393. Available at https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF64896.2025.00030.
  8. Véronique Cortier, Alexandre Debant, Pierrick Gaudry, Léo Louistisserand. Vote&Check: Secure Postal Voting with Reduced Trust Assumptions. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2025, issue 3, pp. 333-348. Available at https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2025-0101.
2026
  1. Tommaso Sacchetti and Daniele Antonioli. BLERP: BLE Re-Pairing Attacks and Defenses. NDSS 2026, 33rd Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, Feb 2026, San Diego, United States. Available at https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2026.240121.
  2. Elsa Lopez Perez, Thomas Watteyne, Cristina Onete, Dhekra Mahmoud, Pascal Lafourcade, Vaishnavi Sundararajan, and Mališa Vučinić. Formal Verification of EDHOC-PSK: A Symbolic Approach with SAPIC. In: Asia CCS'26. Available at https://doi.org/10.1145/3779208.3805979

Tools

Courses on ProVerif

ProVerif was taught at MPRI. Here is a list of some courses on ProVerif by other researchers: