CadeBlanchetPOST13
Bruno Blanchet
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David Cadé and Bruno Blanchet.
Proved Generation of Implementations from
Computationally-Secure Protocol Specifications.
In David Basin and John Mitchell, editors, 2nd Conference on
Principles of Security and Trust (POST 2013), volume 7796 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 63-82, Rome, Italy, March 2013. Springer.
Copyright
© Springer-Verlag.
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Links
LNCS series home page.
This paper at Springer: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36830-1_4.
Long version in Journal of Computer Security.
Abstract
In order to obtain implementations of security protocols proved secure
in the computational model, we have previously implemented a compiler
that takes a specification of the protocol in the input language of
the computational protocol verifier CryptoVerif and translates
it into an OCaml implementation. However, until now, this compiler was
not proved correct, so we did not have real guarantees on the
generated implementation. In this paper, we fill this gap. We prove
that this compiler preserves the security properties proved by
CryptoVerif: if an adversary has probability p of breaking a
security property in the generated code, then there exists an adversary
that breaks the property with the same probability p in the
CryptoVerif specification. Therefore, if the protocol specification
is proved secure in the computational model by CryptoVerif, then the
generated implementation is also secure.
Bibtex
@INPROCEEDINGS{CadeBlanchetPOST13,
AUTHOR = {David Cad{\'e} and Bruno Blanchet},
TITLE = {Proved Generation of Implementations from Computationally-Secure Protocol Specifications},
BOOKTITLE = {2nd Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST 2013)},
PAGES = {63--82},
YEAR = 2013,
EDITOR = {David Basin and John Mitchell},
VOLUME = 7796,
SERIES = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
ADDRESS = {Rome, Italy},
MONTH = MAR,
PUBLISHER = {Springer}
}
E-mail/Courrier électronique : Bruno.Blanchet@trap-inria.fr (remove trap-)