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Bruno Blanchet. A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 140-154, Oakland, California, May 2006.

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We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games; these games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. Our tool provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives, which can handle shared- and public-key encryption, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. Our tool produces proofs valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented our tool and tested it on a number of examples of protocols from the literature.


  AUTHOR = {Bruno Blanchet},
  TITLE = {A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols},
  BOOKTITLE = {IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
  PAGES = {140-154},
  YEAR = 2006,
  ADDRESS = {Oakland, California},

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